Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 24 April, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Weaponized Interdependence: International Monopolies as Determinants of State Power

Dr Claas Mertens, Blavatnik School of Goverment

Recent weaponized interdependence research has focused on mapping international economic structures to explain states’ capacity to inflict costs on foreign actors. This paper proposes a different approach that integrates weaponized interdependence research with microeconomic concepts of substitution. If an international economic exchange is restricted, actors on either end turn to the best available alternative. Substitution costs describe the utility loss actors incur when doing so. The extent of these costs determines whether either side can ‘weaponize’ the exchange. Monopolies and monopsonies are instances where buyers and sellers face high substitution costs as they lack alternatives. The theory delineates three determinants each for international monopolies and monopsonies, offering a nuanced understanding of why states can weaponize the economic exchanges of some market actors but not others. Various cases illustrate the theory, drawing on in-depth interviews. For instance, the cases contrast the know-how and intellectual property underlying technological monopolies in semiconductor production with the international network effects that bolster several monopolies in the realm of international finance. The developed theory reframes and refines the weaponized interdependence discourse and has important implications for policymakers’ ongoing efforts to ‘de-risk’ international economic exchanges without comprehensively ‘decoupling’ them.

Claas Mertens is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow for Net Zero Governance systems. His research focuses on the international political economy of climate change and international economic conflicts, such as economic sanctions and weaponised interdependencies. It also explores intersections between these two areas. His work is published or forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly and The Review of International Organisations.

Before joining the Blavatnik School, Claas was a DPhil student in International Relations at Oxford University’s Department for Politics and International Relations. He also holds an MPhil in Politics from Oxford and a BA in Business from the University of St. Gallen and was a visiting student at Harvard. Before his DPhil, he worked as a management consultant. Claas was Rowing World Champion in 2015 and represented Oxford in the 2018 Oxford-Cambridge Boat Race. Now, he enjoys surfing, where his passion far exceeds his skills.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 28 February, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Strategic Wishes and What Happens Next: Assessing the UK's Integrated Reviews

Dr Maeve Ryan, KCL, & Professor Jamie Gaskarth, Open University 

In the aftermath of the 2019 election, the Boris Johnson government promised "the most radical assessment of the UK’s place in the world since the end of the Cold War.” The result was the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021 and updated in March 2023 by the Integrated Review “Refresh”. This paper aims to evaluate how far these texts achieved their aims so far, and with what consequences British strategic policy. It begins by exploring the contexts of the reviews, how previous iterations informed the framing, approach, evidencing and rationale, and what innovations were introduced. It then engages in a detailed investigation into how these reviews were implemented across government. In the process, we consider what the IR process suggests about the relationship between grand strategic concepts, grand strategic practice, and measuring success in real time.

Dr Maeve Ryan is a Reader in History and Foreign Policy at the Dept. Of War Studies, King’s College London, and the co-founder and co-director of the Centre for Grand Strategy and the Ax:son Johnson Institute for Statecraft and Diplomacy. 

Prof Jamie Gaskarth is Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at The Open University and co-Editor in Chief of Journal of Global Security Studies

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 14 February, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

'Bury them deep in the ground'; The disastrous legacies of 'expeditionary warfare', 'intervention', and 'counterinsurgency' 

Frank Ledwidge, University of Portsmouth

For much of the last forty years 'expeditionary warfare' in one form or another (e.g., humanitarian intervention, 'CT', counterinsurgency), has formed the key mission of the US, UK, and other European armed forces. These have been supported by ideas such as 'new wars' or 'wars amongst the people'.  From these ideas have flowed failed counterinsurgencies and various dubiously legal 'forever wars' being fought even now in states ruined by such 'interventions'. Their legacy has been strategic disaster and the immiseration of millions.

In whatever form, these expeditions are doomed to failure, not least because they invariably lack adequate preparation, resources, knowledge or strategic grounding. More simply, 'intervention' amounts in practical terms to 'invasion' which is rarely welcomed, to say the least. These ideas stagger on today in forms such as (for the UK) 'persistent campaigning'. The very structures of some major armed forces - designed explicitly around 'expeditionary operations' - have become highly distorted and unfit for their supposed function of national defence. We are all less secure as a consequence. 

Frank Ledwidge is senior lecturer in war studies at the University of Portsmouth, working primarily with the Royal Air Force. He is the author of 'Losing Small Wars' (Yale 2011/17), 'Investment in Blood' (Yale 2013), and 'Aerial Warfare' (Oxford 2018/20). He served as a military intelligence officer in Bosnia and Iraq and as a civilian advisor in (inter alia) Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 31 January, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Closed Deal: Private Authority of Companies in Cyber Conflict and Crises

Louise Marie Hurel, London School of Economics and RUSI

The Russo-Ukrainian War has raised significant questions about not only the role of cyber operations in conflict but also the measure of private sector engagement and participation in these contexts. But neither is Ukraine the only testing ground, nor is the presence and gap-filling of private companies in conflict and crises new. This lecture will explore the antecedents, enablers and recent examples of how companies have sought to legitimize and expand their presence in providing cybersecurity in conflict and crises. 

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 17 January, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Mass and Multipolarity: Qualitative and Quantitative Balancing after Western Hegemony  

Dr David Blagden, University of Exeter

The international system is returning to multipolarity—a situation of multiple competing major powers—drawing the post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’ of comprehensive US-led Western political, economic, and military dominance to an end. The rise of China, belligerent assertiveness of Russia, and associated return of multipolarity at the systemic level in turn carry implications for European states’ strategic posture, including that of the UK. In particular, the techno-utopian hope that Britain can achieve its balancing needs through qualitative advantage alone, without significant bolstering of the UK’s quantitative resilience, risks exposure in a world of adversaries capable of their own strategic adaptation and innovation.  

David Blagden is Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Exeter. He was previously the Adrian Research Fellow in International Politics at Darwin College, University of Cambridge. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, the European Journal of International Relations, Security Studies, International Affairs, Survival, and Foreign Policy Analysis, among other outlets; he has also provided public commentary for the BBC, The Guardian, The Spectator, the New Statesman, and other media. On the policy side, Dr Blagden has served as Specialist Adviser to a Parliamentary Select Committee as well as consulting for several UK Government departments and agencies. He is also an officer in the Royal Naval Reserve, and has served at sea and ashore with a number of UK and NATO warships and headquarters. He obtained his BA (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics) and DPhil (International Relations) from the University of Oxford, and his MA (International Relations) from the University of Chicago.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 22 November, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Assessing the Bear: Overestimating the Russian Military

Dr Andrew Bowen, Congressional Research Service

Prior to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, analysts predicted a quick and decisive victory for Russia over Ukraine due the Russian military benefiting from a long and sustained modernization program. It soon became clear that analysts' projections of a quick and decisive victory for Russia were shockingly incorrect. Why was the perception of the Russian military so divergent from its performance in the Ukraine war and why were assessments of the Russian military apparently so inaccurate? Rather than a total analytical failure, however, the answers to these questions aren't so different from other historical examples of inaccurate military performance assessments. In part, analysts failed to adequately appreciate the political context and influence on Russian military operations and an inflated focus on technology and modern equipment. Understanding this case and the factors which contributed to overestimating the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine provide crucial insights into better assessing future dangers and conflicts. 

Andrew Bowen is an Analyst in Russian and European Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) covering Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence issues. He has a Ph.D. from Boston College in International Relations and a Masters in Global Affairs from New York University. 

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 8 November, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Fashions and Fallacies in Contemporary Strategic Thought 

Dr Chiara Libiseller, Leiden University

Every few years a new concept captures the attention of a large part of the strategic studies community. These buzzwords – such as hybrid warfare, grey zone conflict, counterinsurgency or the revolution in military affairs – are both ambiguous and powerful, sparking a wave of publications only to eventually be superseded by the next buzzword. How can we explain this recurring cycle? This talk looks at the dynamics and underlying ideas about war driving this process. It argues that these buzzwords are the outcome of fallacies inherent in much current strategic thinking in the West. 

Dr Chiara Libiseller is a lecturer at the Institute for History at Leiden University and a deputy editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies. She obtained her PhD from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, having written her thesis on ‘The Rise and Fall of Fashionable Concepts in Strategic Studies’. Her most recent output, entitled ‘“Hybrid warfare” as an academic fashion’ was published in the Journal of Strategic Studies. 

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 25 October, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Strategy, surprise and false futurism

Professor Alexander Evans

Given the return of Great Power Competition, could democratic governments have been better at anticipatory policymaking? Have weapons of mass distraction diverted attention from the persistent challenge of war?  To what extent has a self-referential fascination with ourselves, our universalism and challenges to it from within (like radicalisation) diminished our ability to read the prevailing winds of how most states read the world? Have the twin conceits of cultural narcissism and presentism diminished the ability of major democracies to navigate a volatile world?  If lessons are learned from the false futurism of the past, there are ways in which a more robust capability could be fostered in government. To do so, we need to revalorise concepts of biography, radical uncertainty and longitudinal policy-making – none of which are fashionable or prioritised.

Alexander Evans is a Professor in Practice in Public Policy at the London School of Economics.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Illusionary Trends in Strategic Studies Seminar Series

Wednesday 11 October, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Out of the Shadows: The Shock of Non-Hybrid War

Professor Patrick Porter, University of Birmingham

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent attritional war has upended pre-war assumptions about "future war." Futurologists within the broad security penumbra increasingly argued that conflict was becoming hybrid, ambiguous and shadowy, with some arguing that the tools and assumptions of major war were becoming obsolete. While all wars to some degree are "hybrid", the unambiguous, industrial-scale clash in Ukraine is emphatically not what they expected. Why did bright minds fall prey to such expectations? The failure had several causes. One of them is an intellectual failure, either to assume war's form was determined by the tools of globalisation, thereby losing sight of war's political essence, or to assume that the conditions of the unipolar era would endure. This delusion has not gone away, however, and has implications for how we prepare for future conflicts.

 Patrick Porter is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 7 June, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Multinational Coalition Warfare and the Anglo-American Experiment in the Mediterranean, 1942–43

Carson Teuscher, Ohio State University

The origins of modern US-UK-led coalition warfare trace back to the Mediterranean theater of World War II. It was there on the treacherous battlefields of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy where Anglo-American forces learned to harmonize their fighting efforts under a modular and largely experimental integrated headquarters for the first time. Overcoming significant battlefield setbacks between 1942 and 1943, the Allies slowly forged a model for waging effective multinational coalition warfare, one centered on the principles of unity of command, combined operations, partner integration, expeditionary capacity, and robust liaison and logistics support. These pioneering efforts constituted nothing less than an embryonic Allied victory template, one they would export wholesale to great effect in Northwestern Europe and whose legacy lives on to this day.

Carson Teuscher is a Ph.D. Candidate in Military History at Ohio State University. His research focuses on the history of coalition warfare, alliance building, and multinational military operations during World War II. He was previously a non-resident Hans J. Morgenthau fellow in Grand Strategy at the University of Notre Dame and currently holds a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 24 May, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

BRUSA: Wartime Conception and Formative Conduct, 1940-43

Dr John Jenner, KCL

“[T]o all intents and purposes US security is being run for them at the President’s request by the British. A British officer sits in Washington with Mr Edgar Hoover [Director FBI] and [Colonel] Bill Donovan [Coordinator of Information] for this purpose and reports regularly to the President. It is of course essential that this fact should not become known in view of the furious uproar it would cause if known to the Isolationists.”

Major Desmond Morton [PM Churchill’s personal secretary for intelligence liaison]

Conceived by Churchill in the desperate spring of 1940 and delivered covertly by MI6, the birth of the Anglo-American intelligence alliance was formalised on 17 May 1943 in the “Britain-United States of America Agreement” (BRUSA). When Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, Britain’s intelligence services found their American counterparts divided and unfit for purpose. Between the wars, the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS) stole more official secrets from the United States than any other country. Relative to Roosevelt, GCCS’ greatest consumer was by far the better informed suitor during the Anglo-American courtship. In Churchill’s eyes a predominantly isolationist Washington appeared complacently incapable of properly perceiving the existential threat that Nazi Germany posed to America’s and Britain’s eternal interests. As France fell, Britain’s beleaguered new prime minister struggled to secure the nation’s immediate survival and a corollary long-term Allied victory by realising his governing policy objective: the formation of a warfighting alliance with the United States. Informed by GCCS and MI6 covert operations, Churchill adroitly deployed actionable intelligence to lubricate his existential relationship with Roosevelt, engender an Anglophile American central intelligence service, and unify the United States’ disjointed cryptographic services in common cause with GCCS. Against the odds, he succeeded in creating an “unparalleled” security alliance.

Dr John Jenner is Senior Fellow, University of Oxford Rothermere American Institute; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, King’s College London; Director, Bounding Power in the Island Chains, University of Oxford - Office of Naval Research. He holds Master of Studies and Doctor of Philosophy degrees in Modern History from Oxford, and held various academic appointments in Asia, Europe, and the USA. Before his election as Senior Fellow at Oxford he was a First Sea Lord Fellow; Research and Teaching Fellow, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham; and Visiting Research Fellow, University of Cambridge.

In addition to his academic work, John undertakes governmental analytical assignments for policy makers in Whitehall, Washington, and elsewhere including the Indo-Pacific Brief. His current research focuses on U.S.-China strategic engagements in the Indo-Pacific since the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895).

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 10 May, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Joint Strike Fighter and Transatlantic Defence Procurement

Emma Salisbury, Birkbeck University of London

Joint Strike Fighter is the sole example of full-spectrum defence procurement collaboration on a weapons platform between the United States and the United Kingdom. What does the unique nature of the JSF programme tell us about the transatlantic defence-industrial relationship? What other models of cooperation are preferred, and why? How do defence procurement and broader geopolitical factors shape each other within the transatlantic context?

Emma Salisbury is a Ph.D. candidate at Birkbeck College, University of London. Her research explores the concept of the military-industrial complex, with a focus on the United States in the 20th and 21st centuries. She is also a senior staffer at the U.K. Parliament and an Assistant Editor at War on the Rocks. 

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 26 April, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

American Neutrality and the Anglo-American Crisis of 1916

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe, Leiden University

1916 was arguably the lowest point in Anglo-American relations between the War of 1812 and Suez. Tensions arose daily over the British blockade of Europe and American attempts to mediate an end to World War I, causing Woodrow Wilson and his advisors to muse about the possibility of a future war and the British ambassador to consider withdrawing his credentials. In the background lurked even more consequential issues, particularly the steady but perceptible shift of financial – and potentially military – power west over the Atlantic. This talk explores the events of that year and particularly how popular passions and nationalism shaped the relationship.

Andrew Gawthorpe is a University Lecturer in the Institute for History at Leiden University. He is currently leading a five-year research project on “American foreign policy and liberalism”, funded by a grant from the Dutch Research Council. He is the author of To Build as well as Destroy: The American Experience of Nation-Building in the Vietnam War (Cornell 2019) and also contributes widely to popular media, including through his podcast, America Explained.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 1 March, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Jordan and Kuwait: US-UK relations in the aftermath of Suez

Dr Louise Kettle, University of Nottingham

This paper will examine the US-UK relationship through the prism of two key military interventions in the Middle East after the Suez debacle; Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961. It will argue that the 1956 crisis led the UK to acknowledge that its international power was in decline and that future interventions in the region would always require American acquiescence. Having learned these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan endeavoured to use Jordan and Kuwait as a means to realign US-UK policy in the region, believing that he could use US means for UK ends. 

Dr Louise Kettle is an Assistant Professor at the University of Nottingham. She specialises in UK foreign policy specifically in relation to the Middle East. Her recent book Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East examines how the FC(D)O, MoD and intelligence agencies learn from their experiences in the region and she is currently researching the history of UK-Iranian relations. 

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 15 February, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Regional cooperation: US-UK relations and strategic dilemmas following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979-1989

Dr Barbara Zanchetta, King’s College London

This paper will investigate the US and UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with a focus on the longer-term adjustment of policies triggered by this event. Numerous scholars have studied the immediate reaction to the invasion, for example focusing on the tough rhetorical criticism of Moscow, the economic sanctions, and the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games. However, less attention has been devoted to studying the broader significance of the strategic choices made by Washington and London in the aftermath of the Soviet action. By early 1980, with the proclamation of the Carter doctrine, the American administration elevated the Soviet threat to levels reminiscent of the early Cold War period, forcefully placing the Persian Gulf at the centre of US national security concerns. This led to the implementation of directives for the creation of a rapid deployment force (RDF), the expansion of the aid programme channelled to the Afghan resistance, and increased reliance on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to execute these policies. As the main European ally of the United States, London not only shared the fundamental perception of an increased Soviet threat, but backed Washington’s policies with vigour, both rhetorically and concretely. This paper will investigate the rationale behind the US and UK choices, their broader implications, and long-term consequences.

Dr. Barbara Zanchetta is Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She is the author of The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s (Cambridge University Press, 2014), the co-author of Transatlantic Relations since 1945 (Routledge, 2012) and co-editor of New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War: Unexpected Transformations? (Routledge, 2018). Dr. Zanchetta has published articles or book reviews in International Politics, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Diplomatic History, Cold War History, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, International Affairs and for H-Diplo. She is currently working on a monograph tentatively titled The United States and the ‘Arc of Crisis:’ How the Cold War Dominated Strategic Choices in Southwest Asia.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 1 February, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

The Post-Cold War Anglo-American military relationship

Professor Wyn Rees, University of Nottingham

This presentation argues that military cooperation makes an important contribution to the so-called ‘Special Relationship’. Working alongside a superpower on the battlefield has been a challenging task and the British armed services have invested considerable effort to ensure their capability to achieve this end. Looking through the lens of institutionalism helps to explain how predictability and persistent cooperation has been achieved. Two aspects will receive particular attention in this presentation. First, UK-US military cooperation has taken place within a dynamic environment in which the nature of conflict has been evolving. Their armed forces have been required to not only engage in high intensity warfare, but also fashion military doctrines to address insurgency, peace enforcement and nation-building tasks. Second, working with the US military has generated risks as well as benefits for the UK’s armed forces. The UK has engaged in tasks that have weighed heavily upon its resources and this has contributed to tensions between their two armed forces.

Wyn Rees is Professor of International Security in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK. Prior to working at the University of Nottingham, he taught at the University of Leicester, the College of Europe in Bruges and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Professor Rees researches, publishes and teaches on the subjects of transatlantic security relations, British defence policy and counter-terrorism. 

This seminar will held in person as usual and will not be affected by the UCU strikeThis seminar will held in person as usual and will not be affected by the UCU strike

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 18 January, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Declinism in Postwar Britain and the United States

Dr Robert Ralston, University of Birmingham

Both the United States and the United Kingdom have, historically, experienced bouts of “declinism,” or concern over the nation’s international standing. In this paper, I examine declinist narratives in both countries, detailing both their frequency and their interconnections. I argue that declinism impacts not only the domestic and foreign policies of each country independently, but also the nature of the transatlantic relationship more broadly. In particular, I highlight how declinism can unite like-minded leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, whose declinist narratives are tied to ideological projects and whose visions of renewal share common traits. Using the case of Thatcher and Reagan, I highlight how both used declinism as a domestic political narrative for renewal, how they learned from each other, and how their declinism at home shaped the transatlantic relationship.

Robert Ralston is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS) at the University of Birmingham and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was previously a Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft Fellow jointly appointed at the International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School and the Security Studies Program, MIT.  He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota in 2020.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 23 November, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Tipping Points: Post-War Postures in US-UK Environmental and Climate Heritage

Dr Kristin Cook, SOAS

Abstract and bio will be posted shortly.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

This seminar will run on 9th November as originally planned

Wednesday 9 November, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

An Exceptional Relationship? US nuclear strategy and the US-UK Nuclear Relationship

Dr Suzanne Doyle, University of East Anglia

A current debate in nuclear studies is the extent to which the United States has pursued non-proliferation, the centrality of this goal in US grand strategy, as well as the related goal of US nuclear superiority. Within this debate US-UK nuclear cooperation has received little consideration.  This talk will address this gap by analysing US decision-makers views on US-UK nuclear cooperation, US nuclear superiority and non-proliferation policy, from its beginnings in the Manhattan project to the purchase of Trident. The talk will examine the ways in which US decision-makers viewed cooperation alongside strategies of extended deterrence, non-proliferation, and alliance politics but also the often-muddled decisions that led to agreements on nuclear technology transfers.

Dr Suzanne Doyle is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of East Anglia (UEA). She completed her PhD, on the United Kingdom’s purchase of the US Trident missile system, in 2016 at UEA. Suzanne’s work has featured in a range of publications including the Journal of Strategic Studies and The International History Review. Her research interests include nuclear history, transatlantic relations, US and British defence policy, security studies and the Cold War. She completed her MA in Research Methods and International Relations at Durham University and holds an honours degree in Modern History and International Relations from the University of St Andrews. Suzanne is currently working on a monograph analysing the UK’s purchase of Trident missiles from the United States.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 26 October, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

The United States, the United Kingdom and the international financial system since 1945

Dr Michael Hopkins, University of Liverpool

What was the nature of the international financial system that emerged at the end of the Second World War and how did it change over the next 75 years? Within this system, what were the roles of the United States and the United Kingdom? What were the comparative influences of the Americans and British in shaping international finance? In addressing these questions, this paper examines the interplay of the attitudes and actions of the two governments, the activities of bankers and major economic trends. Was it possible for governments to have an impact or were they reduced to responding to larger economic forces? Was this especially true for the UK?

To understand this vast canvas across such a crowded period this paper focuses on four snapshots. First, it considers the immediate implementation of the Bretton Woods system in 1945-1949. Second, it addresses the resurgence of Britain’s role in international finance in the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s. Third, it investigates the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s. Fourth, it examines the financial collapse of 2007-2009.

The paper has three main conclusions. First, the United States played the most important role throughout this period, even though the scale of its dominance progressively declined in the face of rival economic powers. Its government’s decisions and its financiers’ actions shaped developments. Second, the UK had real influence at certain times. Although a much reduced economic power after 1945, sterling was a reserve currency and much of world trade was denominated in pounds. There was, however, a basic tension for the British in trying to operate as a global financial power while being a supplicant for US and IMF assistance. At the same time, the City of London since the early 1960s has been a major financial centre, the leading place in the world for international banking. Third, governments played important roles at key moments, such as the creation of Bretton Woods, the 1971 decision to end convertibility of dollars into gold and the response during the great recession of 2007-2009.

Dr Michael F. Hopkins is Reader in History at the University of Liverpool. His two most recent books are British Financial Diplomacy with North America 1944-1946: the Diary of Frederic Harmer and the Washington Reports of Robert Brand Camden Fifth Series (Cambridge University Press, 2021) and Dean Acheson and the Obligations of Power (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). He will be a Sassoon Visiting Fellow at the Bodleian Library in Hilary Term 2023 working on the project, “Banker, internationalist and diplomat: Robert Brand and international finance.”

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 12 October, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Anglo-American clandestine cooperation: the past, present and future of the Special Intelligence Relationship

Dr Thomas Maguire, Leiden University, & Dr David V. Gioe, King’s College London and West Point

Abstract and bios will be posted shortly.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 2 March, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

The Strategies of Small States: Safeguarding Autonomy and Influencing Great Powers

Dr Hillary Briffa, KCL

When major powers clash, or grow more competitive, the historical record shows that small states are the first to be buffeted by the actions of their larger counterparts. Small states do not set the international agenda. This means that if the fears of a breakdown of the rules-based order are well-founded, it will have profound implications for their security. Thus, these actors must look within their own armoury – at the tactics and strategies available to them, within certain bounds – and consider how much leverage they can exert within the context in which they operate. Can small states do anything more than move swiftly to avoid being trampled when elephants collide? This talk will examine the strategies pursued by small states to safeguard their autonomy (including ‘strategic hedging’ and ‘seeking shelter’); as well as innovative means of projecting influence (ranging from the harnessing of multilateralism to bind great power behaviour, to serving as ‘smart states’ in the international system). Today, increasing antagonism between great powers is already creating serious dilemmas for smaller international actors, and this is likely to intensify in the near future. However, the ability of small states to strategically navigate risk and influence the behaviour of Great Powers means that they can be expected to adapt to these changes. As small states navigate a fading rules-based order, this talk will argue that they have several time-tested strategies in reserve.     

Dr Hillary Briffa is a Lecturer in National Security Studies and the Assistant Director of the Centre for Defence Studies in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she read for her Ph.D, asking whether small states can have a grand strategy. She is also a founding member of the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s, where she serves as the research lead for the Climate Change and International Order portfolio. Previously, she has taught courses across the spectrum of global politics, international relations, defence, foreign policy, security and strategy at the Royal College of Defence Studies, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, University College London, Birkbeck University of London, and Queen Mary University of London. Beyond academia, she served as Malta’s official Youth Ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for three years, and worked at the Malta High Commission to the UK throughout Malta’s tenure as Commonwealth Chair-in-Office. After running peace-building projects in Eastern and Central Europe, in 2015 she was appointed an Associate Fellow of the Royal Commonwealth Society, and in 2016 became a recipient of the U.S. State Department’s inaugural Emerging Young Leaders award.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 16 February, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Cyber Capabilities and Decision Making - if we are being out thought, will we always be outfought?

Sally Walker

Sally Walker spent 25 years in the national security community, laterally as Director Cyber at GCHQ. She had joint responsibility for running the National Offensive Cyber Programme and led the stand up and design of the National Cyber Force.

Since leaving government, Sally advises at board level on decision making in big data environments, and supports boards in leadership development. She retains an interest in the role of cyber capability in conflict, particularly as it affects the civilian population and governmental attitude to risk.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 2 February, 17.15
Seminar Room G, Manor Road Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ.

Presidents, Politics and Military Strategy: Electoral Constraints during the Iraq War

Dr Andrew Payne, University of Oxford

As both commander in chief and holder of the highest elected office in the United States, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet while we all have some intuitive sense that elections “matter” in some way, exactly how, why or when they do so is not well understood. This talk will explore the ways in which electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses action they otherwise deem strategically optimal during an ongoing war. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with former administration officials and senior military leaders, it will demonstrate how the nature and timing of the Iraq surge of 2007, as well as the pace and finality of the subsequent drawdown, were shaped by considerations related to the domestic political calendar.

Dr Andrew Payne is the Hedley Bull Research Fellow in International Relations at the University of Oxford and a Junior William Golding Research Fellow at Brasenose College. His research explores the impact of domestic politics on US foreign policy, with a particular geographical focus on the Middle East. He is currently working on a book manuscript examining the influence of electoral cycle in shaping wartime presidential decision-making, and has wider interests in civil-military relations, diplomatic history, and domestic constraints on US grand strategy. His writing has been published in International Security, Politics, International Affairs, the Conversation and the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage series. In addition to his academic work, Andrew serves on the board of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London.

PLEASE NOTE THE CHANGE OF VENUE.

Seminars at 17.15, Seminar Room G, Manor Road Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 19 January, 17.15
Seminar Room G, Manor Road Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ.

It’s grand, but is it strategy? The origins of ‘grand strategy’ revisited

Dr. David Morgan-Owen, King’s College London

Grand strategy is back en vogue. Policy makers and scholars alike insist that grand strategy is important, and that states need to have one to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Yet defining precisely what it is – or what it entails - has proven extremely difficult. Numerous academics have spilt much ink trying to pin down a usable definition for grand strategy, however we appear no closer to a consensus than we are to a clear definition of ‘strategy’ itself.

What a series of influential thinkers – from Paul Kennedy to Colin Gray – do agree upon, is that humans have pursued grand strategies throughout history. As Kennedy has claimed, ‘all states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not’. According to them, grand strategy has a long history, and has been practiced for millennia.

In this talk, Dr. Morgan-Owen will question this assumption, and show how and why the idea of grand strategy evolved in a particular place at a particular time. Moreover, he’ll argue that there are significant dangers in assuming that all states and groups have a grand strategy – namely, the risk of painting the history of strategy in terms of continuity and similarity. The reality is almost the opposite – grand strategy is a practical endeavour, shaped by context, and which undergoes ongoing change. History has a vital role to play in illustrating this fact, and we risk omitting it from the study of strategy at our peril.

David Morgan-Owen is Senior Lecturer in the School of Security Studies at King's College London. He is author of The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914. Aspects of this talk have been published as “History and the Perils of Grand Strategy” in the Journal of Modern History in June 2020.

PLEASE NOTE THE CHANGE OF VENUE.

Seminars at 17.15, Seminar Room G, Manor Road Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 10 November, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Strategy in practice: The 2021 Integrated Review

Ashlee Godwin

Ashlee Godwin was a member of the No. 10 Integrated Review Taskforce and a co-author of the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

She joined No. 10 on secondment from Parliament, where she is a Senior Specialist in national security and international policy. There, she runs a team of experts working in support of five committees. These include the House of Commons Foreign Affairs, Defence and International Trade Select Committees, in addition to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.   

Ashlee has previously worked at the UK defence think tank RUSI, as Deputy Editor of its flagship policy journal. She is a Fulbright Scholar in US national security policy-making, a Millennium Fellow with the Washington-based Atlantic Council, and in 2019 she participated in the State Department-sponsored International Visitor Leadership Program on cyber security. 

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 27 October, 17.15
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

Reconceptualizing Grand Strategy: A Comparative and Relational Framework 

Thierry Balzacq, Sciences Po

The literature on Grand Strategy has been overwhelmingly populated by work that operates from a rationalist ontology and epistemology. Yet, curiously, it has not employed the methods of systematic comparison often associated with positivist notions of theory building and testing. Scholars employing ideational approaches on issues such as strategic culture and critical theorists have employed comparative approaches in other, sometimes orthogonally related subfields of International Relations. But constructivists, with few exceptions, have remained marginal in the field of grand strategy. They too have not offered a generalized framework for comparison. Fundamentally, the field thus lacks a framework for the systematic study of grand strategy. In this paper we seek to begin to fill that lacunae, employing an ideational, arguably constructivist, ontology and epistemology. First, we briefly describe the gap in the literature and its theoretical importance. Second, we then identify a new, contrasting set of assumptions to those employed in the rationalist literature. Third, we use them to construct a framework that will potentially allow scholars to study national grand strategies – systematically, comparatively and relationally. Initiating work on the basis of such a framework, we argue, may subsequently help develop an understanding of underlying causative relations, expand the universe of cases of grand strategy well beyond that recognized from a rationalist perspective, acknowledge the ideational and relational character of grand strategies.

Thierry Balzacq is Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po and Professorial Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po, Paris. He is the director of graduate studies for international relations at the School of Research at the same university. He was formerly Scientific Director at the French Ministry of Defense (2014-2016), where he contributed to the development of a multi-million euro program to support the study of security in France.  In 2016, Balzacq was awarded a Francqui Research Chair (Belgium’s highest academic title) at the University of Namur. Balzacq was Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Edinburgh (2012-2015). In 2015, he was awarded a Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in Diplomacy and International Security (“Tier 1 Chairs are for outstanding researchers acknowledged by their peers as world leaders in their fields”). He has held various appointments at the Australian National University (ANU), McGill, the LSE, the National University of Singapore (NUS), the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, The International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC), Aberystwyth (Marie Curie Visiting Professor), the University of Niamey (Niger), and ENA. He has published over a hundred and fifty books, articles and book chapters on comparative grand strategy, theories of security (including securitization theories), and diplomatic studies. His most recent books include The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy (2021 co-ed., with Ron Krebs); Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases (Oxford University Press, 2019 – co-ed. with Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich), Théories de la sécurité (Presses de Sciences Po, 2016). He co-edits the Oxford Studies in Grand Strategy book series. Thierry Balzacq holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge and completed his postdoctoral studies at Harvard University. He sits on the editorial boards of Security Studies, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Critical Studies on Security. He is currently working on two books.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 13 October, 1715
Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL

The Integrated Review, the fall of Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific "tilt"

Dr Rob Johnson, CCW

Dr Rob Johnson is the Director of the Changing Character of War (CCW) research centre at Oxford. Rob acts as a specialist advisor to governments and international armed forces on strategy, cyber, ‘new tech’, and the conduct of armed conflict. He has run ‘Insight and Understanding’ courses for a number of agencies on areas of security interest. He is author of Military Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2020), The Conduct of War (Routledge, 2021), and World Information War (Routledge, 2021; Defence Studies series) as well as several other works on conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. He has examined the problems of strategy in a variety of contexts and publications, and draws attention to the local perspectives as well as the difficulties of forming judgements based on a selective reading of history or on the misuse of theories of international relations and politics. He is currently working on a monograph on Anglo-American strategic decision-making in the two world wars (for Oxford University Press), to complement his earlier strategic study of the First World War in the Middle East.

Seminars at 17.15, Wharton Room, All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL.
All are welcome, no need to book.

Wednesday 12 May, 17.15

PRC Gray Zone Operations in the South China Sea

Professor Andrew Erickson, US Naval War College

A component of the People’s Armed Forces (PAF), China’s Maritime Militia is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct state-sponsored activities. Third among China’s sea forces after the Navy and Coast Guard, the PAF Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is locally supported, but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself. China employs the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China has used it to advance its disputed sovereignty claims in international sea incidents, particularly in the South China Sea. Publicly-documented examples include China’s 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam;  involvement in the occupation and development of Mischief Reef resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines; harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels, including the Bin Minh and Viking; harassment of USNS Impeccable (2009); participation in the 2012 seizure of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines and 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal; 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding CNOOC’s HYSY-981 oil rig; layered “cabbage-style” envelopment of the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal near Thitu Island; and most recently in ongoing operations in Union Banks, including Whitsun Reef. This Maritime Power Seminar will explain the nature and significance of China’s third sea force before suggesting broader implications and offering policy recommendations.

Recommended Reading, Downloadable PDFs:

• Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)

• Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at Whitsun Reef

• China’s Maritime Militia Ships at Whitsun Reef

• Manila’s Images Are Revealing the Secrets of China’s Maritime Militia

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). A core founding member, he helped establish CMSI and stand it up officially in 2006, and has played an integral role in its development. CMSI inspired the creation of other research centers, which he has advised and supported; he is a China Aerospace Studies Institute Associate. Erickson is currently a Visiting Scholar in full-time residence at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, where he has been an Associate in Research since 2008. He runs the research website <www.andrewerickson.com>.

Microsoft Teams Meeting: Click here to join the meeting

Wednesday 28 April, 17.15

The Royal Navy in the Indo-Pacific: Why small is sometimes better

René Balletta, Royal Navy

Following the 'tilt' to the Indo Pacific announced in the Integrated Review last month, the First Sea Lord has confirmed the forward deployment of a Batch 2 Offshore Patrol Vessel to support the UK's wider regional interests. Some have commented that an OPV is not fit for the task.  This talk examines the platform options open to the Royal Navy and supports the case that, at this moment in time, OPVs are the right platform for the task.

René Balletta is this year’s Royal Navy Hudson Fellow and a Visiting Research Fellow with CCW. Commissioned into the Royal Navy as a Warfare Officer in 1992, René has served the majority of his career at sea in a variety of surface platforms that include frigates, destroyers, amphibious assault ships, aircraft carriers and the Royal Yacht. He has been involved in maritime operations across the globe from the NATO-led naval blockade off the Former-Yugoslavia in 1993, through to anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa in 1996; from support operations to land forces in Afghanistan in 2003, through to sitting on the gunline off Libya in 2011. More recently, he has been using his linguistic skills in France as the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) lead-planning officer for the French Maritime Component Commander during the delivery of the CJEF concept. He graduated from the Ecole de Guerre (the French Advanced Command & Staff Course) in 2017 gaining a French Masters in Management, Command & Strategy and went on to complete his second French Masters in International Relations at the Sorbonne in 2019 whilst working at the French Ministry of Defence. René’s research interests are focused on the development of the Royal Navy’s transformation programme for Forward Presence and how this can assist the delivery of a Global Britain in the 21st Century.

Microsoft Teams Meeting: Click here to join the meeting